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PANEL DISCUSSION
The discussion opened with two questions posed by Professor Freund to
Professor NageL*
We have been talking ... largely ... in terms of political action or
state policy. I am wondering if there is anything to be gained by asking a
question in a somewhat more naked form. If it were not necessary to
resort to coercion in any way, but simply a question of voluntary moral
choice-say you were constructing a Utopia without regard to how you
got there-would you opt for equality as perfect and universal as possible,
or for inequality?. . . In other words, how much wrestling with this prob-
lem has to do with the element of coercion and, therefore, the sacrifice of
autonomy-respect, if you will-and how much has to do with doubts
intrinsic to the very idea of equality?
The second question . . . is this: What is meant by the term urgent
claims, or urgent or more urgent interest? Does it beg some questions to
say that the claims of the worse-off are more urgent? Usually, when we
say urgent or more urgent, we have in mind some further end-urgent in
order to do this or accomplish that-and is not that the real question,
which is obscured by the term urgent?
Professor Nagel responded"
Those are both very good questions and rather difficult ones. To the
first, I would answer that above a certain level of benefit, equality is not
particularly desirable; that it is a moral and social goal that may be worth
the trouble, which it always causes, only when the inequalities one is try-
ing to eliminate put some people in a position that is deprived in a fairly
serious way.
Urgency is another question-begging notion, and I am not sure how to
fill it out. In most societies, some people are seriously and justifiably dis-
content with their lot. As long as that is so, the problem of equality sur-
vives. But if serious deprivation were eliminated, it would be different. If
you had to choose between a distribution of incomes ranging from
$50,000 to $500,000 a year and one with everybody at $100,000 a year,
there would be no problem of equality of all. The question arises only
when urgent needs among the worst-off group are not being met. Ur-
gency is, I think, a very difficult problem, but I believe that it is possible to
give it an objective interpretation. The urgent needs, those that may have
a claim to priority over others, are the things that are necessary for the
pursuit of any of the aims that an individual may have in life. They have
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a certain universality. I think that medical care is urgent because it is a
precondition, if you get sick, of proceeding with an ordinary life or
whatever you want to do; and as society evolves, the things that occupy
these positions will change. Education is now, it seems to me, in the cate-
gory of a basic need and at a higher level than it formerly was. In gen-
eral, I would say that that position of being-a precondition of living out
a life that you yourself can plan and use to achieve your own aims-puts
something into the category of urgency.
Some other questions were implicit in the discussion and left open. Is
basic personal-status equality constitutional in dimension, whereas distri-
butional equality, which focuses particularly on economic well-being, leg-
islative in dimension? Even so, what is to be done when the latter affects
the former? When are we equal enough to be treated equaly? How are
we to choose among dfferent kinds of equality: equality of opportunity,-
equality of conditionv and equality of treatment? Specificall, how are we
to juxtapose claims for preferential affirmative action and claimsfor per-
sonal equality of opportunity.
Responding to the question about preferential treatment, Professor
Nagel stated that such claims again involve the subjective concept of
urgency,
I doubt that those who favor preferential admissions to medical schools
would be in favor of weighted voting on a racial basis, even though it
might have effects that this person would be willing to pursue in other
ways. The same goes for a special tax deduction for minority group mem-
bers. One can think of a lot of things that would be counted as denial of
equal treatment in too fundamental a way to be considered as methods
for improving the position of minorities. The reason the admissions issue
is a close one is that it does not seem to be one of the fundamental rights.
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